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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-367
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CAROL ANKENBRANDT, as next friend and mother
of l. r. and s. r., PETITIONER v. JON A. RICHARDS
and DEBRA KESLER
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the fifth circuit
[June 15, 1992]

  Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court.
  This case presents the issue whether the federal courts
have jurisdiction or should abstain in a case involving
alleged torts committed by the former husband of petitioner
and his female companion against petitioner's children,
when the sole basis for federal jurisdiction is the diversity-
of-citizenship provision of 28 U. S. C. 1332.
                            I
  Petitioner Carol Ankenbrandt, a citizen of Missouri,
brought this lawsuit on September 26, 1989, on behalf of
her daughters L. R. and S. R. against respondents Jon A.
Richards and Debra Kesler, citizens of Louisiana, in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana.  Alleging federal jurisdiction based on the
diversity of citizenship provision of 1332, Ankenbrandt's
complaint sought monetary damages for alleged sexual and
physical abuse of the children committed by Richards and
Kesler.  Richards is the divorced father of the children and
Kesler his female companion.  On December 10, 1990, the
District Court granted respondents' motion to dismiss this
lawsuit.  Citing In re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586, 593-594
(1890), for the proposition that -[t]he whole subject of the
domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child,
belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the
United States,- the court concluded that this case fell
within what has become known as the -domestic relations-
exception to diversity jurisdiction, and that it lacked
jurisdiction over the case.  The court also invoked the
abstention principles announced in Younger v. Harris, 401
U. S. 37 (1971), to justify its decision to dismiss the
complaint without prejudice.  Ankenbrandt v. Richards, No.
89-4244 (ED La. Dec. 10, 1990).  The Court of Appeals
affirmed in an unpublished opinion.  Ankenbrandt v.
Richards, No. 91-3037 (CA5 May 31, 1991), judgt. order
reported at 934 F. 2d 1262.
  We granted certiorari limited to the following questions:
-(1) Is there a domestic relations exception to federal
jurisdiction? (2) If so, does it permit a district court to
abstain from exercising diversity jurisdiction over a tort
action for damages? and (3) Did the District Court in this
case err in abstaining from exercising jurisdiction under the
doctrine of Younger v. Harris, [supra]?-  502 U. S. ___
(1992).  We address each of these issues in turn.
                           II
  The domestic relations exception upon which the courts
below relied to decline jurisdiction has been invoked often
by the lower federal courts.  The seeming authority for
doing so originally stemmed from the announcement in
Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582 (1859), that the federal
courts have no jurisdiction over suits for divorce or the
allowance of alimony.  In that case, the Court heard a suit
in equity brought by a wife (by her next friend) in federal
district court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction against her
former husband.  She sought to enforce a decree from a
New York state court, which had granted a divorce and
awarded her alimony.  The former husband thereupon
moved to Wisconsin to place himself beyond the New York
courts' jurisdiction so that the divorce decree there could
not be enforced against him; he then sued for divorce in a
Wisconsin court, representing to that court that his wife
had abandoned him and failing to disclose the existence of
the New York decree.  In a suit brought by the former wife
in Wisconsin Federal District Court, the former husband
alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction.  The court
accepted jurisdiction and gave judgment for the divorced
wife.
  On appeal, it was argued that the District Court lacked
jurisdiction on two grounds: first, that there was no
diversity of citizenship because although divorced, the wife's
citizenship necessarily remained that of her former hus-
band; and second, that the whole subject of divorce and
alimony, including a suit to enforce an alimony decree, was
exclusively ecclesiastical at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution and that the Constitution therefore placed the
whole subject of divorce and alimony beyond the jurisdiction
of the United States courts.  Over the dissent of three
Justices, the Court rejected both arguments.  After an
exhaustive survey of the authorities, the Court concluded
that a divorced wife could acquire a citizenship separate
from that of her former husband and that a suit to enforce
an alimony decree rested within the federal courts' equity
jurisdiction.  The Court reached these conclusions after
summarily dismissing the former husband's contention that
the case involved a subject matter outside the federal
courts' jurisdiction.  In so stating, however, the Court also
announced the following limitation on federal jurisdiction:
      -Our first remark is-and we wish it to be remem-
bered-that this is not a suit asking the court for the
allowance of alimony.  That has been done by a court
of competent jurisdiction.  The court in Wisconsin was
asked to interfere to prevent that decree from being
defeated by fraud.
      -We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts
of the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for
the allowance of alimony, either as an original proceed-
ing in chancery or as an incident to divorce a vinculo,
or to one from bed and board.-  Barber, supra, at 584.
As a general matter, the dissenters agreed with these
statements, but took issue with the Court's holding that the
instant action to enforce an alimony decree was within the
equity jurisdiction of the federal courts.
  The statements disclaiming jurisdiction over divorce and
alimony decree suits, though technically dicta, formed the
basis for excluding -domestic relations- cases from the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, a jurisdictional
limitation those courts have recognized ever since.  The
Barber Court, however, cited no authority and did not
discuss the foundation for its announcement.  Since that
time, the Court has dealt only occasionally with the
domestic relations limitation on federal-court jurisdiction,
and it has never addressed the basis for such a limitation.
Because we are unwilling to cast aside an understood rule
that has been recognized for nearly a century and a half, we
feel compelled to explain why we will continue to recognize
this limitation on federal jurisdiction.
                            A
  Counsel argued in Barber that the Constitution prohibit-
ed federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over domestic
relations cases.  Brief for Appellant in Barber v. Barber,
D.T. 1858, No. 44, pp. 4-5.  An examination of Article III,
Barber itself, and our cases since Barber makes clear that
the Constitution does not exclude domestic relations cases
from the jurisdiction otherwise granted by statute to the
federal courts.
  Article III, 2, of the Constitution provides in pertinent
part:
      -Section 2.  The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitu-
tion, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between
two or more States;-between a State and Citizens
of another State;-between Citizens of different
States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming
Land under Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.-
This section delineates the absolute limits on the federal
courts' jurisdiction.  But in articulating three different
terms to define jurisdiction-``Cases, in Law and Equity,-
-Cases,- and -Controversies--this provision contains no
limitation on subjects of a domestic relations nature.  Nor
did Barber purport to ground the domestic relations
exception in these constitutional limits on federal jurisdic-
tion.  The Court's discussion of federal judicial power to
hear suits of a domestic relations nature contains no
mention of the Constitution, see Barber, supra, at 584, and
it is logical to presume that the Court based its statement
limiting such power on narrower statutory, rather than
broader constitutional, grounds.  Cf. Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades
Council, Inc., 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988).
  Subsequent decisions confirm that Barber was not relying
on constitutional limits in justifying the exception.  In one
such case, for instance, the Court stated the -long estab-
lished rule- that federal courts lack jurisdiction over certain
domestic relations matters as having been based on the
assumptions that -husband and wife cannot usually be
citizens of different States, so long as the marriage relation
continues (a rule which has been somewhat relaxed in
recent cases), and for the further reason that a suit for
divorce in itself involves no pecuniary value.-  De La Rama
v. De La Rama, 201 U. S. 303, 307 (1906).  Since Article III
contains no monetary limit on suits brought pursuant to
federal diversity jurisdiction, De La Rama's articulation of
the -rule- in terms of the statutory requirements for
diversity jurisdiction further supports the view that the
exception is not grounded in the Constitution.
  Moreover, even while citing with approval the Barber
language purporting to limit the jurisdiction of the federal
courts over domestic relations matters, the Court has heard
appeals from territorial courts involving divorce, see, e.g.,
De La Rama, supra; Simms v. Simms, 175 U. S. 162 (1899),
and has upheld the exercise of original jurisdiction by
federal courts in the District of Columbia to decide divorce
actions, see, e.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 581,
n. 54 (1962).  Thus, even were the statements in De La
Rama referring to the statutory prerequisites of diversity
jurisdiction alone not persuasive testament to the statutory
origins of the rule, by hearing appeals from legislative, or
Article I courts, this Court implicitly has made clear its
understanding that the source of the constraint on jurisdic-
tion from Barber was not Article III; otherwise the Court
itself would have lacked jurisdiction over appeals from
these legislative courts.  See National Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U. S. 582, 643 (1949) (Vinson,
C. J., dissenting) (-We can no more review a legislative
court's decision of a case which is not among those enumer-
ated in Art. III than we can hear a case from a state court
involving purely state law questions-).  We therefore have
no difficulty concluding that when the Barber Court
-disclaim[ed] altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the
United States upon the subject of divorce,- 21 How., at 584,
it was not basing its statement on the Constitution.
                            B
  That Article III, 2, does not mandate the exclusion of
domestic relations cases from federal-court jurisdiction,
however, does not mean that such courts necessarily must
retain and exercise jurisdiction over such cases.  Other
constitutional provisions explain why this is so.  Article I,
8, cl. 9, for example, authorizes Congress -[t]o constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court- and Article III, 1,
states that -[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish.-  The Court's cases state the rule that -if inferior
federal courts were created, [Congress was not] required to
invest them with all the jurisdiction it was authorized to
bestow under Art. III.-  Palmore v. United States, 411 U. S.
389, 401 (1973).
  This position has held constant since at least 1845, when
the Court stated that -the judicial power of the United
States . . . is (except in enumerated instances, applicable
exclusively to this court) dependent for its distribution and
organization, and for the modes of its exercise, entirely
upon the action of Congress, who possess the sole power of
creating the tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court) . . .
and of investing them with jurisdiction either limited,
concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction
from them in the exact degrees and character which to
Congress may seem proper for the public good.-  Cary v.
Curtis, 3 How. 236, 245.  See Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441
(1850); Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170
U. S. 511 (1898); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U. S. 226
(1922); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U. S. 182 (1943).  We thus
turn our attention to the relevant jurisdictional statutes.
  The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that -the circuit
courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the
courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at
common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute
exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred
dollars, and . . . an alien is a party, or the suit is between
a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen
of another State.-  Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 11, 1 Stat. 78.
(Emphasis added.)  The defining phrase, -all suits of a civil
nature at common law or in equity,- remained a key
element of statutory provisions demarcating the terms of
diversity jurisdiction until 1948, when Congress amended
the diversity jurisdiction provision to eliminate this phrase
and replace in its stead the term -all civil actions.-  1948
Judicial Code and Judiciary Act, 62 Stat. 930, 28 U. S. C.
1332.
  The Barber majority itself did not expressly refer to the
diversity statute's use of the limitation on -suits of a civil
nature at common law or in equity.-  The dissenters in
Barber, however, implicitly made such a reference, for they
suggested that the federal courts had no power over certain
domestic relations actions because the court of chancery
lacked authority to issue divorce and alimony decrees.
Stating that -the origin and the extent of [the federal
courts'] jurisdiction must be sought in the laws of the
United States, and in the settled rules and principles by
which those laws have bound them,- the dissenters contend-
ed that -as the jurisdiction of the chancery in England does
not extend to or embrace the subjects of divorce and
alimony, and as the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States in chancery is bounded by that of the chancery in
England, all power or cognizance with respect to those
subjects by the courts of the United States in chancery is
equally excluded.-  Barber, supra, at 605 (Daniel, J.,
dissenting).  Hence, in the dissenters' view, a suit seeking
such relief would not fall within the statutory language -all
suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity.-  Because
the Barber Court did not disagree with this reason for
accepting the jurisdictional limitation over the issuance of
divorce and alimony decrees, it may be inferred fairly that
the jurisdictional limitation recognized by the Court rested
on this statutory basis and that the disagreement between
the Court and the dissenters thus centered only on the
extent of the limitation.
  We have no occasion here to join the historical debate
over whether the English court of chancery had jurisdiction
to handle certain domestic relations matters, though we
note that commentators have found some support for the
Barber majority's interpretation.  Certainly it was not
unprecedented at the time for the Court to infer, from what
it understood to be English chancery practice, some guide
to the meaning of the 1789 Act's jurisdictional grant.  See,
e.g., Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212, 221-222 (1818).
We thus are content to rest our conclusion that a domestic
relations exception exists as a matter of statutory construc-
tion not on the accuracy of the historical justifications on
which it was seemingly based, but rather on Congress'
apparent acceptance of this construction of the diversity
jurisdiction provisions in the years prior to 1948, when the
statute limited jurisdiction to -suits of a civil nature at
common law or in equity.-  As the court in Phillips, Nizer,
Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F. 2d 509, 514
(CA2 1973) observed, -[m]ore than a century has elapsed
since the Barber dictum without any intimation of Congres-
sional dissatisfaction. . . .  Whatever Article III may or may
not permit, we thus accept the Barber dictum as a correct
interpretation of the Congressional grant.-  Considerations
of stare decisis have particular strength in this context,
where -the legislative power is implicated, and Congress
remains free to alter what we have done.-  Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172-173 (1989).
  When Congress amended the diversity statute in 1948 to
replace the law/equity distinction with the phrase -all civil
actions,- we presume Congress did so with full cognizance
of the Court's nearly century-long interpretation of the prior
statutes, which had construed the statutory diversity
jurisdiction to contain an exception for certain domestic
relations matters.  With respect to the 1948 amendment,
the Court has previously stated that ``no changes of law or
policy are to be presumed from changes of language in the
revision unless an intent to make such changes is clearly
expressed.''  Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp.,
353 U. S. 222, 227 (1957); see also Finley v. United States,
490 U. S. 545, 554 (1989).  With respect to such a long-
standing and well-known construction of the diversity
statute, and where Congress made substantive changes to
the statute in other respects, see 28 U. S. C. 1332 note, we
presume, absent any indication that Congress intended to
alter this exception, see ibid.; Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 2,
Advisory Committee Note 3, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 555, that
Congress -adopt[ed] that interpretation- when it reenacted
the diversity statute.  Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580
(1978).
                           III
  In the more than 100 years since this Court laid the
seeds for the development of the domestic relations excep-
tion, the lower federal courts have applied it in a variety of
circumstances.  See, e.g., cases cited in n. 1, supra.  Many
of these applications go well beyond the circumscribed
situations posed by Barber and its progeny.  Barber itself
disclaimed federal jurisdiction over a narrow range of
domestic relations issues involving the granting of a divorce
and a decree of alimony, see 21 How., at 584, and stated
the limits on federal-court power to intervene prior to the
rendering of such orders:
-It is, that when a court of competent jurisdiction over
the subject-matter and the parties decrees a divorce,
and alimony to the wife as its incident, and is unable
of itself to enforce the decree summarily upon the
husband, that courts of equity will interfere to prevent
the decree from being defeated by fraud.  The interfer-
ence, however, is limited to cases in which alimony has
been decreed; then only to the extent of what is due,
and always to cases in which no appeal is pending from
the decree for the divorce or for alimony.''  Id., at 591.
  The Barber Court thus did not intend to strip the federal
courts of authority to hear cases arising from the domestic
relations of persons unless they seek the granting or
modification of a divorce or alimony decree.  The holding of
the case itself sanctioned the exercise of federal jurisdiction
over the enforcement of an alimony decree that had been
properly obtained in a state court of competent jurisdiction.
Contrary to the Barber dissenters' position, the enforcement
of such validly obtained orders does not -regulate the
domestic relations of society- and produce an -inquisitorial
authority- in which federal tribunals -enter the habitations
and even into the chambers and nurseries of private
families, and inquire into and pronounce upon the morals
and habits and affections or antipathies of the members of
every household.-  Id., at 602 (Daniel, J., dissenting).  And
from the conclusion that the federal courts lacked jurisdic-
tion to issue divorce and alimony decrees, there was no
dissent.  See Barber, supra, at 604 (Daniel, J., dissenting)
(noting that -[u]pon questions of settlement or of contract
connected with marriages, the court of chancery will
undertake the enforcement of such contracts, but does not
decree alimony as such, and independently of such con-
tracts-).  See also Simms v. Simms, 175 U. S. 162, 167
(1899) (stating that -[i]t may therefore be assumed as
indubitable that the Circuit Courts of the United States
have no jurisdiction, either of suits for divorce, or of claims
for alimony, whether made in a suit for divorce, or by an
original proceeding in equity, before a decree for such
alimony in a state court-).
  Subsequently, this Court expanded the domestic relations
exception to include decrees in child custody cases.  In a
child custody case brought pursuant to a writ of habeas
corpus, for instance, the Court held void a writ issued by a
Federal District Court to restore a child to the custody of
the father.  -As to the right to the control and possession of
this child, as it is contested by its father and its grandfa-
ther, it is one in regard to which neither the Congress of
the United States nor any authority of the United States
has any special jurisdiction.-  In re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586,
594 (1890).
  Although In re Burrus technically did not involve a
construction of the diversity statute, as we understand
Barber to have done, its statement that -[t]he whole subject
of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and
child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws
of the United States,- id., at 593-594, has been interpreted
by the federal courts to apply with equal vigor in suits
brought pursuant to diversity jurisdiction.  See, e.g.,
Bennett v. Bennett, 221 U. S. App. D. C. 90, 93, 682 F. 2d
1039, 1042 (1982); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F. 2d 1018,
1025 (CA3 1975); Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F. 2d 316,
317 (CA2 1967); see generally 13B C. Wright, A. Miller,
& E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 3609,
pp. 477-479, nn. 28-32 (1984).  This application is consis-
tent with Barber's directive to limit federal courts' exercise
of diversity jurisdiction over suits for divorce and alimony
decrees.  See Barber, supra, at 584.  We conclude, there-
fore, that the domestic relations exception, as articulated by
this Court since Barber, divests the federal courts of power
to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.  Given
the long passage of time without any expression of congres-
sional dissatisfaction, we have no trouble today reaffirming
the validity of the exception as it pertains to divorce and
alimony decrees and child custody orders.
  Not only is our conclusion rooted in respect for this long-
held understanding, it is also supported by sound policy
considerations.  Issuance of decrees of this type not infre-
quently involves retention of jurisdiction by the court and
deployment of social workers to monitor compliance.  As a
matter of judicial economy, state courts are more eminently
suited to work of this type than are federal courts, which
lack the close association with state and local government
organizations dedicated to handling issues that arise out of
conflicts over divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.
Moreover, as a matter of judicial expertise, it makes far
more sense to retain the rule that federal courts lack power
to issue these types of decrees because of the special
proficiency developed by state tribunals over the past
century and a half in handling issues that arise in the
granting of such decrees.  See Lloyd v. Loeffler, supra, at
492.
  By concluding, as we do, that the domestic relations
exception encompasses only cases involving the issuance of
a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree, we necessarily
find that the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the
District Court's invocation of this exception.  This lawsuit
in no way seeks such a decree; rather, it alleges that
respondents Richards and Kesler committed torts against
L. R. and S. R., Ankenbrandt's children by Richards.
Federal subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 1332 thus
is proper in this case.  We now address whether, even
though subject-matter jurisdiction might be proper, suffi-
cient grounds exist to warrant abstention from the exercise
of that jurisdiction.
                           IV
  The Court of Appeals, as did the District Court, stated
abstention as an alternative ground for its holding.  The
District Court quoted another federal court to the effect
that -`[a]bstention, that doctrine designed to promote
federal-state comity, is required when to render a decision
would disrupt the establishment of a coherent state policy.'-
App. to Pet. for Cert. A-6 (quoting Zaubi v. Hoejme, 530 F.
Supp. 831, 836 (WD Pa. 1980)).  It is axiomatic, however,
that -[a]bstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is
the exception, not the rule.'-  Colorado River Water Conser-
vation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 813 (1976).
Abstention rarely should be invoked, because the federal
courts have a -virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise
the jurisdiction given them.-  Id., at 817.
  The courts below cited Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37
(1971), to support their holdings to abstain in this case.  In
so doing, the courts clearly erred.  Younger itself held that,
absent unusual circumstances, a federal court could not
interfere with a pending state criminal prosecution.  Id., at
54.  Though we have extended Younger abstention to the
civil context, see, e.g., Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v.
Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U. S. 423 (1982); Ohio Civil
Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U. S.
619 (1986); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U. S. 1 (1987),
we have never applied the notions of comity so critical to
Younger's -Our Federalism- when no state proceeding was
pending nor any assertion of important state interests
made.  In this case, there is no allegation by respondents of
any pending state proceedings, and Ankenbrandt contends
that such proceedings ended prior to her filing this lawsuit.
Absent any pending proceeding in state tribunals, therefore,
application by the lower courts of Younger abstention was
clearly erroneous.
  It is not inconceivable, however, that in certain circum-
stances, the abstention principles developed in Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943), might be relevant in a
case involving elements of the domestic relationship even
when the parties do not seek divorce, alimony, or child
custody.  This would be so when a case presents -difficult
questions of state law bearing on policy problems of
substantial public import whose importance transcends the
result in the case then at bar.-  Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist., supra, at 814.  Such might well be the
case if a federal suit were filed prior to effectuation of a
divorce, alimony, or child custody decree, and the suit
depended on a determination of the status of the parties.
Where, as here, the status of the domestic relationship has
been determined as a matter of state law, and in any event
has no bearing on the underlying torts alleged, we have no
difficulty concluding that Burford abstention is inappropri-
ate in this case.
                            V
  We thus conclude that the Court of Appeals erred by
affirming the District Court's rulings to decline jurisdiction
based on the domestic relations exception to diversity
jurisdiction and to abstain under the doctrine of Younger v.
Harris, supra.  The exception has no place in a suit such as
this one, in which a former spouse sues another on behalf
of children alleged to have been abused.  Because the
allegations in this complaint do not request the District
Court to issue a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree,
we hold that the suit is appropriate for the exercise of
1332 jurisdiction given the existence of diverse citizenship
between petitioner and respondents and the pleading of the
relevant amount in controversy.  Accordingly, we reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                      It is so ordered.